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RECENT DECISIONS
that the statute as literally read is constitutional. However, even
if this position is correct, it would not adversely affect the
majority's holding, since they were justified in performing "judicial
surgery" based on the "drastic result" concept.
Even though damages are limited to the portion of exag-
geration attributable to willfulness, the effectiveness of section 39-a
is still guaranteed. For example, if a lienor has a valid claim
for $10,000, but files a lien for $20,000-including in this $10,000
exaggeration, $2,000 due to honest, though mistaken belief, and
$8,000 due to willfulness-he will forfeit the lien and, in addition,
pay a penalty of $8,000. Under these circumstances a lienor
would be foolish to attempt to enforce the lien. If the lienor
does attempt to enforce an exaggerated lien, as a matter of legal
strategy, he might well be advised to discontinue his action if
the defendant-owner threatens to institute a counterclaim pursuant
to section 39-a, since a foreclosure proceeding is in fact a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the statute.
It is submitted that the majority's construction of section 39-a
still affords adequate protection to owners and contractors against
whom exaggerated liens have been filed. It also insulates lienors
from the sting of unnecessary penalties, which the legislature
probably did not intend. Thus, since there does not appear to be
direct comment or legislative history on the statute, the majority
was warranted in utilizing a construction process designed to
ascribe the most reasonable legislative intention
23
M
TAXATION - SECTION 7605 (b) - INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
NOT REQuIRED TO SHow PROBABLE CAUSE IN OBTAINING SUB-
POENA OF TAx REcoRms. - The Internal Revenue Service sum-
moned one Powell to produce records concerning prior tax returns
made by a corporation of which Powell was president. Powell
refused to comply, claiming that since the three-year statute of
limitation had expired, the assessment must be predicated on fraud,'
and in order to examine the records for fraud there must be a
showing of "probable cause." The Supreme Court, in reversing
23 Chief Judge Cardozo wrote that "the legislator has only a fragmentary
consciousness of the law" and when the question is one of fixing meaning
to the rules which he prescribes, one should search at their source, that is,
social utility. CARDOzo, THE: NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 122 (1932).
See generally Note, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUm.
L REV. 957, 970-74 (1940).1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6501 (a), (c). See generally 5 RABKI N &
JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOmE, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §§ 76.01(1), (2)
(1964).
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the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, ordered compliance with the
summons and held that the Commissioner need not show probable
cause of suspected fraud until the taxpayer raised a "substantial
question" of abuse of process. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S.
48 (1964).
Whether the Commissioner must, in order to support his sub-
poena for the production of records, show probable cause to suspect
fraud after the expiration of the statute of limitations on assessment
has been the subject of conflicting decisions among various circuits.2
In O'Connor v. O'Connell,3 a First Circuit case, the taxpayer
was summoned to testify concerning certain tax liabilities after the
statute of limitations had run. When the taxpayer refused to com-
ply, the Commissioner sought an order enforcing the subpoena
contending that the revenue agent's testimony concerning his belief
that the taxpayer had filed fraudulent returns was sufficient. The
court refused to grant the order and held (1) that the Service must
establish probable cause to suspect fraud in order to justify its
investigation into a closed year, and (2) that the agent's testimony
in and of itself was not sufficient to constitute such probable cause.4
The court, relying on Section 7605 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 which protects taxpayers from unnecessary examinations
and limits the Service to one examination for each taxable year
unless the taxpayer is notified in writing that an additional inspec-
tion is necessary, reasoned that by the enactment of this section,
Congress must have intended to impose a requirement of probable
cause."
In a subsequent case, the same court stated that the purpose
of this construction was to prevent the Commissioner from conduct-
ing "fishing expeditions" into a taxpayer's closed years and from
"acting upon a mere hunch or a vague surmise."'6
2 See Wall v. Mitchell, 287 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1961), wherein the court
noted the conflict among the several circuits.
3 253 F2d'365 (1st Cir. 1958).
4 Id. at 370.
5 Ibid. Pursuant to this 'decision, the issue of probable cause was adjudi-
cated, not by affidavits, but at a hearing which inquired into the question
of a reasonable suspicion of fraud. 8A MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
INcOmE TAXATrON § 47.48 (rev. ed. 1964).6 Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959). The Ninth Cir-
cuit, in an early decision, adopted the requirement of probable cause, but did
so without expressing an opinion as to its soundness. Martin v. Chandis Sec.
Co., 128 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1942). This rule was later modified by
Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1956). Recently, this circuit
stated that an examination of books for a closed year cannot be unnecessary
if it is in accordance with statutory purposes. The court considered the
investigation of fraud to be within these authorized purposes and concluded
with the statement that if "justification" was necessary, the evidence presented
was sufficient to satisfy this requirement. De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79,
87-91 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963). Thus, the trend in this
circuit appeared to be toward an elimination of the probable cause requirement.
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The position of the Second Circuit is exemplified by the case
of United States v. United Distillers Prod. Corp.7  Rejecting the
probable cause contention and reasoning that while the statute
of limitations bars additional assessment, it does not preclude in-
vestigation, the court noted that the Service should not "be required
to prove the grounds of its belief prior to an examination of the
only records which provide the ultimate proof."8
In a subsequent decision, this circuit, relying on its prior posi-
tion, ruled in favor of the Commissioner upon the mere submission
of affidavits. It was noted that there was no requirement to show
probable cause for the enforcement of administrative subpoenas. In
holding the Service's summonses similarly unrestricted, 9 the court
espoused the principle that an examination was neither unnecessary
nor unreasonable merely because the statute of limitations had ex-
pired. Therefore, it permitted the Commissioner to conduct his
examination in order to determine whether liability did in fact
exist.'0
In the instant case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was of
the opinion that since any additional assessment must be based on
fraud, any re-examination would be unnecessary unless probable
cause for such examination is shown.'" Furthermore, there must
be an adversary proceeding to determine the reasonableness of the
revenue agent's suspicion.'
2
The Supreme Court, in reversing this decision, refused to con-
strue section 7605(b) as requiring a showing of probable cause. 3
The majority reasoned that such an interpretation would seriously
7 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946).
8Id. at 874.
9 Foster v. United States, 265 F2d 183, 186 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 912 (1959). Contra, In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc., 39 F. Supp.
304 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). The Second Circuit has also decided that section
7605(b), which prohibits unnecessary examinations, applies only to taxpayers
and not to third-party examinations. Application of Magnus, 299 F2d 335, 336
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962). See generally 5 RABKIN &
JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 71.02A (6) ; Cooper, Federal Agency Investi-
gations: Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 MrcH. L. RE-v.
187, 204 (1961).
20 Foster v. United States, supra note 9, at 187. The Sixth Circuit has
also held that Congress does not specifically require the Service to show,
as a condition precedent to the exercise of its investigatory power, a prob-
able cause. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would seriously curtail
the ability of the Commissioner to perform his assigned duties. The court
noted, however, that it may inquire into the good faith and purpose of the
examination and may grant relief from oppressive procedures. United States
v. Ryan, 320 F.2d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 61 (1964).
"United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914, 915 (3d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379
U.S. 48 (1964); Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. lZv. 878 (1964).
12United States v. Powell, supra note 11, at 916. Accord, Lash v. Ni-
ghosian, supra note 6; O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365, 370 (1st Cir.
1958).
"3United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 53 (1964).
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hamper the investigatory power of the Commissioner and that the
legislative history of the section indicated that Congress did not in-
tend to impose such a severe limitation.14
The Court further noted that its decision was in accord with
earlier holdings which refused to apply the probable cause require-
ment to investigative subpoenas of other administrative agencies."5
Thus, it was concluded that probable cause is not required to obtain
enforcement of a summons either before or after the running of
the statute of limitations.-
The Commissioner must, however, show (1) that the investi-
gation is pursuant to legitimate purpose; (2) that it is relevant to
that purpose; (3) that the information sought is not in the posses-
sion of the Commissioner; and (4) that the required administrative
procedures have been followed. 17 A taxpayer may challenge the
summons for failure to comply with these requirements and upon
such a challenge, the enforcing court may inquire into the reasons
for the examination. The burden of proof, however, to establish
an abuse is on the taxpayer.'
The dissent,' 9 on the other hand, considered that the expiration
of the statute of limitations created a presumption that the examina-
tion is "unnecessary" within the meaning of 7605(b) and, as a
consequence, the burden is on the Service to show the necessity for
the examination.20 They also felt that this interpretation would
give substance to the statute of limitations by protecting taxpayers
"from invasion by mere administrative fiat."121
The present decision has formulated a concrete guideline for
the circuits in reviewing the Service's requests for the enforcement
of subpoenas requiring the production of records. In those circuits
which heretofore required probable cause, the holding will greatly
broaden the investigatory power of the Service.
Furthermore, by holding that the burden is upon the taxpayer
to come forward in the initial instance, the Court is, in effect, re-
14 The Court, in its review of legislative intent, relied on the discussion
of Senators Penrose and Walsh which revealed that the purpose of section
7605(b) was to relieve honest taxpayers from the petty annoyance of
repetitive examinations by overzealous investigators. The Court felt that
to require a probable cause standard "would substantially overshoot the goal
which the legislators sought to attain." Id. at 54-55.
15 Id. at 57. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 216 (1946); DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW §3.12 (1959). See generally
Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of
Documents, 60 MICH. L. Rav. 187 (1961).16 United States v. Powell, supra note 13, at 57.
'7 This last factor is generally a writing notifying the taxpayer of the
additional examination. Id. at 57-58.
18 Ibid.
19 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice
Stewart and Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred.




quiring the taxpayer to produce the records. This assumption is
predicated on the fact that it would be almost impossible for the
taxpayer to otherwise obtain evidence of harassment or irrelevancy.
Thus, as a practical matter, it appears that the Service can
inquire into closed years without considering the expiration of the
statute of limitations. If, however, an investigation into such a
year revealed a tax deficiency which was not fraudulent, the tax-
payer would still be protected against additional assessment because
of the statute.
22
In addition, tax investigations are limited by several pragmatic
considerations. The Service cannot afford to investigate indiscrim-
inately because its heavy workload prohibits additional examinations
unless there is a valid reason for suspecting fraudulent conduct.
Thus, it would appear that the Court recognized that the earlier
fears of Congress concerning harassment of taxpayers by unneces-
sary and repetitive examinations have not materialized and that
the internal procedures of the Service are sufficient to prevent ex-
cessive abuses.
Since this decision is directly supported by legislative intent, by
direct analogy to the requirements of other administrative agencies,
and by certain practical safeguards, the majority appears to be
justified in its elimination of the often burdensome probable cause
requirement. Certainly, if the Service were to attempt to use this
decision as a spring board for various "fishing expeditions" into the
taxpayer's closed years, the courts could prevent such excesses by
recourse to the abuse of process limitation. Therefore, this decision
should have a beneficial effect upon the investigatory power of the
Service while providing sufficient protection to the taxpayer.
X
ToRTs - MUNICIPAL CoRoRATIoNs - CITY HELD NOT LIABLE
FOR FAILURE TO ENFORCE MULTIPLFE RFSIDENCE LAW. - Follow-
ing a fire in a multiple residence, a fire captain verbally ordered
that the use of a defective oil heater be discontinued. No further
action was taken by the city. Subsequently a fire caused by the
defective heater occurred in the same building, and plaintiff, a
resident of the building, brought a negligence action against the city
alleging that the fire captain failed to report the defective heater
as required by Section 303 of the Multiple Residence Law. In af-
firming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the Court of
Appeals held that the Multiple Residence Law creates no liability
for damage resulting from failure to comply with its provisions.
22INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§6501(a), (c). See generally 5 RAEiciN &
JoaNsox, op. cit. supra note 1, § 76.01.
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